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1. Introduction 
Recently, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Europe from emerging markets reached a 
record high in 2013 (Ernst and Young 2014: 6). Indeed, Emerging Market Multinationals 
(EMNCs) have started to play an increasingly important role in the economic globalisation 
processes (UNCTAD 2006). Unsurprisingly, explaining the rather sudden rise of EMNC 
investments in developed markets has become a major concern among policy makers and 
scholars over the last few years (Ramamurti and Singh 2009; Ramaurti 2009a,b; Cuervo-
Cazurra and Ramamaurti 2014; Brennan 2011; Goldstein 2007; Khanna and Palepu 2006). 
Internationalisation of Turkish Multinational Corporations (TMNCs) is part of this 
economic globalisation process. According to UNCTAD (2015: 52), TMNC outward 
investments reached 6.7 billion US dollars in 2014, or increased by 89% compared to the 
previous year. In 10 years, from 2004 to 2013, TMNC greenfield investments increased over 
threefold from 2.2 billion US dollars to 6.9 billion US dollars (fDi intelligence database).  
During the same period, the top 62 TMNC acquisitions, whose value exceeded 10 
million US dollars, increased over 17 times from 108 million US dollars to 1.8 billion US 
dollars (Thomson Reuters Mergers and Acquisitions database and Deloitte Turkish Outbound 
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M&A Review 2012-2013). More significantly, over 95% of these investments are new 
investments rather than an expansion of existing investments. Thus, it is legitimate to 
investigate this new spectacular increase in TMNC investment activities. Further, several 
Turkish firms have internationalised in aggressive and innovative ways, whilst competing with 
established players. Some of the non-financial TMNCs are now among the world¶V global 
players in several industries, ranging from food (Yildiz Holding) to ferrocrome (Yildirim 
Group), to tiles (Eczacibasi Yapi).  
One area that has not received much attention in the past literature on EMNCs, however, 
is the recent geographical and sectoral spread, motivations, and competitive advantages of 
TMNCs; whether these investments represent theoretical and empirical challenges to existing 
knowledge, or whether they can be explained within the existing theoretical frameworks that 
have been used to explain developed country MNCs (see Bakir 2016).  
This chapter offers answers to questions such as: Where do TMNCs go? What are their 
Firm Specific Advantages (FSAs) and Country Specific Advantages (CSAs)? Why do they 
internationalise? Are widely used frameworks in international business (IB) theory relevant to 
explain TMNC behaviour? Are some of the largest TMNC acquisitions in EU motivated by 
the global consolidator strategy? How do structural complementarities inform the outcome 
of TMNC acquisitions? 
This chapter finds that the largest TMNCs employ multiple strategies in developed and 
developing country markets. 75% of TMNC greenfield FDI (or about 35 billion US dollars) is 
directed towards transition and developing economies. TMNCs mainly exploit FSAs (dynamic 
capabilities) obtained at home, such as managerial and market knowledge, expertise, 
technology, local/regional brands and distribution channels, and expertise in operating in 
relatively weak institutional environments in these economies. They also exploit traditional 
locational advantages, or CSAs, such as economies of scale and leadership in home market, 
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geographical, cultural and institutional proximity. In contrast to greenfield investments, 50% of 
their acquisitions (or 4.9 billion US dollars) are in developed countries, where they not only 
exploit current FSAs obtained from home CSAs, but also aim to explore FSAs obtained from 
host CSAs through their subsidiaries. In regards to motivations, 701&V¶ JUHHQILHOG
investments are mainly motivated by market-seeking FDI, including access to host country 
markets and neighbouring regions, efficiency-seeking FDI such as cost and tax advantages, and 
resource-seeking FDI such as access to natural resources.  
TM1&V¶ DFTXLVLWLRQV DUH PRVWO\ motivated by strategic asset-seeking FDI such as 
access to global brands, international experience, knowledge, distribution networks, and 
cutting-edge competitive technology. In doing so, they aim to increase their market share and 
profitability at home and abroad. This chapter also highlights the global consolidator strategy 
of some TMNCs and the significance of structural complementarities arising from the structural 
context informing TMNC investment behaviour.  
Data for this chapter come from the Financial Times Ltd fDi Intelligence (2003-2013) 
and Thomson Reuters Mergers and Acquisitions Database (from 1 January 2000 to 30 January 
2011) and Deloitte Turkish Outbound M&A Review 2012-2013. It also benefits from secondary 
written sources. Acquisitions data focuses on transactions over 10 million US dollars by 
TMNCs where at least 51% of ownership belongs to a Turkish owner.  
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section two offers a literature review. 
Section three focuses on greenfield investment trends by TMNCs with special reference to 
economic development of host countries, regional, country-based, and sectoral distribution of 
the value of these investments. Section four does the same for outbound acquisitions. Section 
five discusses the internationalisation strategies and motivations of some of the largest TMNCs, 
and the role of structural complementarities in informing TMNC internationalisation strategy. 
The conclusion summarizes the main findings. 
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2. Literature Review 
Research and practice regarding the internationalisation of firms have been dominated 
by the Eclectic paradigm (Dunning 1988), and FSAs and CSAs frameworks (Rugman and 
Verbeke 1990). The Eclectic paradigm is based on Ownership, Location, and Internalisation 
advantages (OLI framework). Ownership advantages such as technology, knowhow, and brand, 
indicate who is going to produce abroad ³and for that matter, other forms of international 
activity´ (Dunning, 1993: 142). These advantages are also labelled as FSAs. Locational factors 
refers to home country resource endowments, such as natural resources, labour, market size, 
DQGLQVWLWXWLRQVWKDW³influenc[e] where to produce´ (Dunning, 1993: 143). These advantages 
DUHDOVRNQRZQDV&6$VWKDW³can be based on natural resource endowments (minerals, energy, 
forests), market, labouU IRUFH DQGRU DVVRFLDWHG FXOWXUDO IDFWRUV´ 5XJPDQ  
InternalisDWLRQ DGYDQWDJH ³addresses the question of why firms engage in FDI rather than 
license foreign firms to use theiUSURSULHWDU\DVVHWV´ (Dunning, 1993: 145). Here, ownership 
advantages are exploited internally where such advantages are not sold to third parties through 
contracts such as licensing and the establishment of joint ventures (i.e., MNCs do not sell their 
FSAs to their rivals). OLI advantages are regarded as the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for the internationalisation of MNCs (Hennart 2012: 169). It is widely held that developed 
country multinationals mostly rely on the exploitation of their FSAs, such as technology, 
knowhow, and brand, whilst developing country MNCs do not have strong FSAs, and they rely 
heavily on CSAs, such as cheap labour, natural resources, and access to state funds (Rugman 
2009). It is widely recognised that MNCs from developing countries have home CSAs, such as 
cheap and skilled labour, scale advantages arising from strong demand in growing domestic 
markets (Luo and Tung 2007), and they enjoy monopolistic power in home markets (Klein and 
Wocke 2007). Several studies argued that EMNCs internationalise to gain FSAs in host 
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countries, rather than exploiting their existing FSAs obtained in home countries (Mathews 
2002; Luo and Tung 2007; Ramamurti and Sigh 2009; Williamson et.al. 2013).  
 Recently, it has been argued that EMNCs have several FSAs obtained in home markets, 
which are different than standard FSAs or ownership advantages of developed country MNCs. 
As Ramamurti (2012: 42) rightly notes:  
Among the ownership advantages attributed in the literature to EMNEs is their deep understanding of 
customer needs in emerging markets, the ability to function in difficult business environments, their 
ability to make products and services at ultra-low costs, their ability to develop ³good HQRXJK´ products 
with the right feature-price mix for local customers, and so on. 
 
Some of the EMNCs are ³JOREDOFRQVROLGDWRUV,´ZKRDUH WKH OHDGHUV LQ WKHLUKRPH
markets and consolidate the industry globally by acquiring firms in developed countries 
(Ramamurti and Sigh 2009). For example, in his analysis of Indian MNCs, Ramamurti (2013: 
LGHQWLILHV³WKHJOREDOFRQVROLGDWRUVWUDWHJ\>WKDW@W\SLFDOO\DULVHVLQLQGXVWULHs that have 
matured in developed countries but are booming in emerging markets ± industries like 
FHPHQWVWHHOFKHPLFDOVZKLWHJRRGVDXWRPRELOHVEHYHUDJHVDQGSURFHVVHGIRRGV´7KHVH
firms use the mix of FSA exploitation and FSA exploration for efficiency. Further, Ramamurti 
and Sigh (2009: 141-142) note that  
7KHGLVWLQJXLVKLQJIHDWXUHRIWKHJOREDOFRQVROLGDWRU«LVWKDWLWVFRPSHWLWLYHDGYDQWDJHVFDQEHOHYHUDJHG
in both emerging economies and advanced countries, resulting in the potential for up-market exports and 
)',«>WKLV LV EHFDXVH@ LQGXVWU\-specific factors ± specifically, in the degree to which products and 
production processes [that] can be standardized across countries, regardless of per-capita income, wages, 
or cultural differences.  
 
Has there been any TMNC that adopted the global consolidator strategy?  This chapter also 
aims to address this question with special reference to Yildiz Holding, the largest food 
manufacturer and marketer in Turkey, which acquired top global brands such as the Belgium 
chocolate maker, Godiva Chocolatier in 2007, and the top manufacturer and marketer of 
biscuits in the UK, United Biscuits in 2014. 
Past research has also shown that MNCs have four main motivations in 
internationalisation (Dunning 1993; Narula and Dunning 2010). These are: 1) natural resource-
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seeking to access host country resources; 2) market-seeking to access host country markets and 
regions, to overcome trade-related and other restrictions, as well as to become closer to 
customers; 3) efficiency-seeking to decrease costs and reconfigure supply chains; and 4) 
strategic asset-seeking to acquire intangible assets such as knowhow and brand. The first three 
motivations relate to the exploitation of FSAs obtained from home country CSAs, whilst the 
last one relates to the exploration of FSAs obtained from host country CSAs.  
More recently, for Rugman and Nguyen (2014: 56-57), ³>Q@HZ LQWHUQDWLRQDOL]DWLRQ
theory maintains that FSAs can be developed by both parent firms in the home countries and 
foreign subsLGLDULHVLQWKHKRVWFRXQWULHV«:KDWLVPLVVLQJIURPDOOWKHH[WDQWOLWHUDWXUHRQ
EMNCs is the interaction between foreign subsidiaries RI (01&V DQG WKH KRVW &6$V´ 
Accordingly this chapter considers FSAs obtained from both home and host CSAs.  
More significantly, this chapter highlights some of the weaknesses in the IB theory, 
namely the significance of the largely ignored structural context that informs investment 
decisions and entry strategies of MNCs. It shows that structural complementarities (i.e., 
interdependence of structural influences on MNC behaviour) reinforce FSAs and/or CSAs 
generating similar incentives that influence the internationalisation outcomes of MNCs (for a 
detailed discussion on the structural complementarities in the context of bank behaviour, see 
Bakir 2013; for the role of institutional complementarities on actor behaviour, see Campbell 
2011 and Crouch 2010). In this context, the sociology and political economy literature may 
offer new analytical insights highlighting the utility of introducing structural variables. In doing 
so, we can further understand the timing and context of internationalisation of MNCs. 
)ROORZLQJ6HZHOOVWUXFWXUHV³DUHVHWVRIPXWXDOO\VXVWDLQLQJVFKHPDVDQGUHVRXUFHV
that HPSRZHUDQGFRQVWUDLQVRFLDODFWLRQDQGWKDWWHQGWREHUHSURGXFHGE\WKDWVRFLDODFWLRQ´
Here, structures refer to broader material and ideational contexts within which institutions (i.e., 
formal and informal rules and norms that guide the behaviour of agents) and agents (e.g., 
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individuals and organisations) are embedded. Structures, like institutions, inform the 
internationalisation of MNCs. The examples include crises, wars, technical and technological 
innovations, macroeconomic structures, market structures, currency structures, ideational 
structures etc., that guide the behaviour of corporations  
This nuanced view is important because it moves beyond conventional FSA and CSA 
based analysis of firms¶ internationalisDWLRQ DFWLYLWLHV )RU H[DPSOH DOWKRXJK 01&V¶
internationalisation activity is informed by FSAs and CSAs, the realisation of investment may 
require the existence of structural compOHPHQWDULWLHV WKDW UHLQIRUFHD ILUP¶VPRWLYDWLRQVDQG
strategies (If one wishes to race ahead, I summarise this point in section five below). These 
complementarities may create structural-level enabling conditions for outward investment.  
There are four main contributions of this chapter to these discussions on EMNCs. First, 
there is an empirical gap in the past EMNC literature which ignored internationalisation of 
TMNCs. This literature mostly focuses on MNCs from Brazil, Russia, India and China (here 
after BRIC) (see for example, Ramamurti and Singh 2009; Guillén and García-Canal 2012; 
Cuervo-Cazurra ve Ramamaurti 2014; 'HPLUED÷ DQG Yaprak, 2015). Second, it shows that 
TMNCs have ownership advantages or FSAs which are different than developed country 
MNCs. This finding is largely ignored in the previous research on TMNCs and some of the IB 
perspectives on EMNCs which have focused on CSAs. Third, it also argues that ³PRGHUQ
international business theory [that has been developed to analyse Western MNCs], with its 
distinctions between FSAs generated by home or host country recRPELQDWLRQV´5XJPDQDQG
Nguyen 2014: 76), is highly relevant in explaining some of the TMNC investments. In addition 
to exploiting standard FSAs obtained from 7XUNH\¶V&6$V, such as economies of scale, and 
low labour cost, TMNCs also explore ownership advantages and strategic assets (also known 
as dynamic capabilities or FSAs) obtained from foreign MNCs and markets. Finally, it offers 
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examples of influence of largely ignored structural complementarities in informing the 
outcomes of (01&V¶LQWHUQDWLRQDOLVDWLRQVWUDWHJ\ 
This chapter also makes three main contributions to the previous literature on TMNCs 
and outward Turkish FDI VHH IRUH[DPSOH$NoDR÷OX(UGLOHN, 2007; Kaya and 
Erden 2008; Kaya 2009). First, although TMNC internationalisation activities have exploded 
over the last 10 years, our knowledge of outward TMNC investments is limited. Earlier studies 
have mainly focused on the 1990s when EMNCs were relatively opaque in the global business 
environment and the literature on EMNCs was underdeveloped. Second, the current study pays 
special attention to the TMNC investments in advanced developed regions and countries, in 
particular the European Union (EU), with special reference to some of the cutting edge 
discussions in the newly emerging EMNC literature. Third, one of the unique contributions of 
this chapter to the literature on TMNCs is its reliance on the analysis of private databases. The 
previous studies have used publicly available aggregated data supplied by the Central Bank of 
the Republic of Turkey, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) or 
newspapers (bkz. $NoDR÷OX.D\DPDQG +LVDUFÕNOÕODUThe current chapter instead 
uses private databases and firm-specific data which focus on the last decade rather than the 
1990s. Thus this chapter offers discussions about individual TMNC advantages and motivations 
in their recent integration with the economic globalisation process. 
 
 
 
 
3. Greenfield Investments by Turkish MNCs 
Table 9.1: Greenfield investments of non-financial TMNCs (2003-2013) 
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Year 
Number of 
Investments 
Number of 
Investor 
Companies 
Total 
Investment 
Value (million 
US dollars) 
Average Value 
of Capital 
Investment by 
Companies 
(million US 
dollars) 
Total 
Employment 
Created 
Average 
Employment 
Created by 
Companies 
2003 109 58 7,750 133.6 30,574 527 
2004 66 48 2,374 49.5 10,450 218 
2005 67 41 4,074 99.4 25,836 630 
2006 51 37 1,941 52.5 14,520 392 
2007 37 33 2,399 72.7 15,346 465 
2008 64 52 4,464 85.8 16,649 320 
2009 63 59 4,068 68.9 20,811 353 
2010 100 67 3,852 57.5 21,689 324 
2011 66 50 4,911 98.2 6,699 134 
2012 86 59 4,155 70.4 12,797 217 
2013 83 65 6,864 105.6 20,643 318 
Total 792 438 46,852 81.28 196,014 354 
Source: fDi ,QWHOOLJHQFHIURPWKH)LQDQFLDO7LPHV/WG$XWKRU¶VFDOFXODWLRQV 
Note:* Includes real sector firms and financial firms.  
       ** Share of foreign MNCs operating in Turkey in total is negligible.  
 
Table 9.1 presents data for greenfield activities of TMNCs, such as building factories 
and opening branches or stores between January 2003 and December 2013. During this period, 
438 TMNCs invested over 46 billion US dollars in 792 investments. Over 95% of TMNCs are 
family-owned firms rather than state-owned firms. These investments created employment 
opportunities for over 196 thousand people. On average, each TMNC invested 82 million US 
dollars and employed 354 people. 2003 witnessed a record in total capital investment with 7.7 
billion US dollars. This could be connected to the postponed investments due to the 2001 
economic and financial crisis in Turkey. The second highest investment was realised in 2013. 
In 2009 and 2010, when the repercussions of the global financial crisis were felt, outward 
investment declined around 10% compared to 2008. 
3.1  Regional Distribution of Investment Flows 
Figure 9.1 shows the distribution of the value of TMNC investments among host 
countries according to their level of economic development. Transition economies (21.4 billion 
US dollars or 46% of the total) and developing countries (13.7 billion US dollars or 29%) 
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received the highest value of investments. Compared to these economies, investments to 
developed economies are higher in number, yet lower in value (10.6 billion US dollar or 22%). 
 
Figure 9.1: Distribution of non-financial TMNC Investments by A Host &RXQWU\¶V
Economic Development 
(2003-2013, Value of Investments - Million USD) 
 
 
Source: fDi ,QWHOOLJHQFHIURPWKH)LQDQFLDO7LPHV/WG$XWKRU¶VFDOFXODWLRQV 
 
What does the fact that around 75% of TMNC greenfield FDI is directed towards 
transition and developing economies mean? TMNCs use the competitive advantages in areas 
such as costs, management, marketing, logistics, and technology that they gained to reach new 
markets in developing and transition economies (see section 5). In contrast, the total value of 
investments by Turkish companies in developed country economies is about 20% of the total. 
This may be due to these firms¶ weak FSAs in these markets. In contrast, the emerging interest 
of TMNCs in the least developed countries suggests that the share of LDCs (3% at present) 
might increase in time. 
21,437.9; 46%
13,702.1; 29%
10,565.8; 22%
1,351.1; 3%
Transition Countries
Developing Countries
Developed Countries
Least Developed Countries
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3.2 Geographical Distribution of Greenfield FDI 
Figure 9.2 shows the geographical distribution of TMNC greenfield investments by 
value. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) received the highest investments with 
18.5 billion US dollars or 39% of the total investments. The second most attractive location for 
greenfield investments by TMNCs is the EU, which attract 18% of the total investments. 318 
investments have been made in this region by 217 TMNCs and over 41 thousand people were 
employed by the investment worth 8 billion US dollars. 
. 
Figure 9.2: Geographical Distribution of non-financial TMNC Investments 
(2003-2013, Value of Investments - Million USD) 
 
 
Source: fDi ,QWHOOLJHQFHIURPWKH)LQDQFLDO7LPHV/WG$XWKRU¶VFDOFXODWLRQV 
 
3.3 Distribution of Greenfield FDI among Countries 
 Figures 9.3 and 9.4 show the value and number of investments by TMNCs among the 
EU countries, respectively. However, in terms of the value of investments, Bulgaria, which has 
the largest Turkish minority population in the Balkans, and Romania together attracted over 5 
18,501.2; 39%
8,640.3; 18%
5,785; 12%
4,039.5; 9%
3,082.1; 7%
2,936.7;6%
1,361.8; 3%
1,182.1; 3% 1,322.7; 3%
CIS
EU
North Africa
West Asia
South Asia
Southeast Europe
Africa
East Asia
Other
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billion US dollars, or about 60%. Germany, which hosts the largest Turkish population in 
Europe, attracted the third largest TMNC greenfield investments in the EU (970 million US 
dollars or 11%), and Romania received the highest employment and investment in value. They 
are followed by Germany, France and Greece. Apparently, historical, cultural and geographic 
proximity also informed TMNC internationalisation in these countries. 
 
Figure 9.3: Distribution of non-financial TMNC Investments in EU Countries 
(Number of Investments) 
 
Source: fDi ,QWHOOLJHQFHIURPWKH)LQDQFLDO7LPHV/WG$XWKRU¶VFDOFXODWLRQV 
 
 
 
Figure 9.4: Distribution of non-financial TMNCs Investments in EU Countries 
(2003-2013, Value of Investments - Million USD) 
114; 36%
51; 16%
45; 14%
16; 5%
13; 4%
79; 25%
Germany
Romania
Bulgaria
UK
France
Other
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Source: : fDi Intelligence from the Financial Times Ltd. $XWKRU¶VFDOFXODWLRQV 
 
It is interesting to note that between 2003 and 2013, the top ten countries, ranked by the 
number of projects, attracted about a total of 20 billion US dollars in TMNC greenfield 
investments (including both financial and non-financial firms), which constituted about 50% of 
total greenfield investments (fDi Intelligence Database 2013). More interestingly, 96% of these 
investments were in developing and transition economies, whilst two developed economies, 
Germany and the US each had only a 2% share among these top 10 destinations. The number 
of investments by TMNCs in Germany reached 114 (or 36%) which was followed by Romania 
(51 or 16%) and Bulgaria (45 or 14%). 
 
3.4 Sectoral Distribution of Greenfield Investments by non-financial TMNCs 
As Figure 9.5 shows, between 2003 and 2013, the highest value of investment was in 
the real estate sector (11 billion US dollars or 25%). It was followed by coal, petroleum, and 
natural resources (6.9 billion US dollars or 15%), textile (4 billion US dollars, or 9%), hotel 
2,657;  31%
2,561.7; 30%
970.4; 11%
3,88.8; 
4%
287.3; 3%
1,775.1; 21%
Romania
Bulgaria
Germany
France
Greece
Other
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management and tourism (2.7% US dollars or 6%) and construction and building materials (2.2 
billion US dollars or 5%). 
 
Figure 9.5: Sectoral Distribution of non-financial TMNC investments  
(2003-2013, Value of Investments - Million USD) 
 
Source: fDi ,QWHOOLJHQFHIURPWKH)LQDQFLDO7LPHV/WG$XWKRU¶VFDOFXODWLRQV 
 
What do we know about the distribution of these top three sectoral investments of 
701&V¶ DFURVV UHJLRQV DQG FRXQWULHV? The fDi database shows that the EU is the second 
highest recipient of the real estate investments (1.7 billion US dollars or 15% of the total) after 
CIS countries (7.2 billion US dollars or 62%). The EU is also the third largest recipient of textile 
investments from TMNCs (443 million US dollars or 11%). However, the EU receives only 
263 million US dollars (or 4%) of TMNC investments in Coal, Petroleum, and Natural 
Resources. Turkish investors lean towards neighbouring CIS countries and transition 
economies in Europe, especially countries such as Bulgaria, Romania, and Russia in the real 
estate, food, and mining sectors, where they have FSAs and aim to accesses host country CSAs.  
 
 
Figure 9.6: The largest TMNC investments in EU by sector 
11,559; 25%
6,905; 15%
4,045; 8%
2,748; 6%
2,225; 5%
19,369; 41%
Real Estate
Coal, Petroleum and Natural
Resources
Textiles
Hotel Management and Tourism
Construction and Building
Materials
Other
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(2003-2013, Value of Investments - Million USD) 
 
 
6RXUFHI'L,QWHOOLJHQFHIURPWKH)LQDQFLDO7LPHV/WG$XWKRU¶VFDOFXODWLRQV 
 
As Figure 9.6 shows, real estate, and coal, oil and natural gas are the top two sectors in 
TMNC investments in the EU. It is interesting to note that financial services, building and 
construction materials, and consumer products each have a 7% share in TMNC investments.  
 
3.5 Top 10 non-financial TMNCs in Greenfield Investments 
Table 9.3 shows 10 TMNCs that have made the highest value of international 
investments between 2003 and 2013. They mostly originate from Istanbul, and have created 
over 54 thousand jobs, with nearly 15 billion US dollars¶ ZRUWK RI LQYHVWPHQW LQ QHDUE\
transition economies and developing countries. Investments were primarily targeted towards 
construction projects in the real estate industry. It is also shown that the investments by these 
companies constitute between 20% and 40% of the total investments made by Turkish investors 
in a given year. In contrast to MNC¶s from BRIC countries, which mostly invest in developed 
2,217.23; 19%
1,426.39; 12%
866.7; 7%
861.71; 7%
813.052; 7%
5,803.107; 48%
Real Estate
Coal, Oil and Natural
Gas
Financial Services
Building &
Construction
Materials
Consumer Products
Others
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European markets such as the UK, Germany, and France, most of the TMNCs invest in 
transition and developing economies. As shown above, these investments are concentrated in 
Bulgaria and Romania.  
A closer look at the TMNC sectoral activities in Bulgaria and Romania shows that 
TMNCs invest in banking, insurance services, chemicals, home appliances, textile, logistics, 
parks, residential, and hotel sub-sectors. Specifically, Romania is a significant market for 
Turkish real estate investments. %XOJDULD DQG5RPDQLD¶V(8PHPEHUVKLSKDVEHHQDPDMRU
structural event that opened a window of opportunity to Turkish construction firms to undertake 
some of the EU-funded infrastructure investments in these countries.  
Table 9.3: Top 10 non-financial TNCs in Terms of value of capital investments, 2003-2013 (Million USD) 
Investor 
Company Home  City 
Jobs 
Created 
(person) 
Value of 
Investment 
(million USD) Sectors 
Host Countries (Year, number of 
investments) 
Ramenka Istanbul 21,826 2,452 
Food and Tobacco, 
Real Estate 
Kazakhstan (2009, 1),  Russia 
(2003,11; 2004, 3; 2005, 18; 2006, 4; 
2013, 1)   
Rixos Hotels Antalya 3,389 2,061 
Hotels & Tourism, 
Leisure & Entert. 
Austria (2007, 1); Azerbaijan (2012, 
1);  Bahrain (2010,1); UAE (2008,2; 
2011,1; 2012, 1); Croatia (2007,1); 
Montenegro (2013, 1); Kazakhstan 
(2005,1; 2009,1; 2013, 1); Libya 
(2010,1); Egypt (2012, 1);  Russia 
(2008, 1); Ukraine (2005,1) 
Enka Istanbul 4,625 1,847 
Real Estate, Natural 
Resources 
Russia (2003,1; 2008;2), Tajikistan 
(2006, 1)  
Enisa Group Istanbul 161 1,819 
Coal, Oil and 
Nat.Resources Morocco (2011, 1) 
Migros Istanbul 4,388 1,614 
Real Estate and 
Entertainment 
France (2004, 1); Iran (2003, 1), 
Macedonia (2003, 2; 2006, 1); Syria 
(2003,1); Ukraine (2003, 1) 
Renaissance 
Construction Istanbul 11,761 1,548 
Real-Estate and 
Entertainment Russia (2005, 1; 2008,1; 2010, 4) 
Hakkan Mining 
and Generation 
Industry and Trade Istanbul 345 1,095 
Coal, Oil and 
Nat.Resources Ruanda (2012, 2) 
Opus Project & 
Development Not Spec. 3,000 956 Real Estate Romania (2007, 1) 
Kastamonu Entegre Istanbul 4,241 945 Wood Products 
Bosnia Herzegovina (2003, 1; 2007,1); 
Bulgaria (2006,1; 2011,1); Romania 
(2008,1); Russia (2009,1) 
Aria Istanbul 730 913 Communications 
Germany (2003, 1); United Kingdom 
(2003, 1); Czech Republic ( 2003,1); 
Philippines (2003,1);  Hong Kong 
(2003,1); Switzerland (2003,1); Italy 
(2003,1);  Russia (2003,1); Singapore 
(2003,1); Taiwan (2003,1) 
Total of top 10 54,466 15,250   
Total OFDI performed by Turkish 
MNCs 196,014 46,851   
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Percentage of top 10 companies in total 28% 33%     
Source: fDi ,QWHOOLJHQFHIURPWKH)LQDQFLDO7LPHV/WG$XWKRU¶VFDOFXODWLRQV 
 
4. Acquisitions by TMNCs 
Figure 9.7: Yearly Distribution of value and number of TMNC Acquisitions (2000-2013) 
 
Sources: Thomson Reuters Mergers and Acquisitions Database and Deloitte Turkish Outbound M&A Review 
2012-2013. 
 
Figure 9.7 shows the distribution of the number and value of the top 62 TMNC 
acquisitions whose value exceeded 10 million US dollars between 2000 and 2013. These 
701&V¶KDGDERXWELOOLRQ86GROODUs in acquisitions, which constituted 72% of the total 
investments. During this period, TMNC acquisitions increased 44 times, from about 41 million 
US dollars to 1.8 billion US dollars.  2001, 2003, and 2009 were the years during which no such 
investments were made. The 2001 Turkish economic crisis and the effects of the global 
financial crisis in 2009 were the main reasons for the absence of investments in these years. 
2011 marked the highest investments in value, with 2.6 billion US dollars. 
Here the focus is on the acquisitions of TMNCs whose majority shareholders are 
Turkish citizens. During the acquisition deals, TMNCs in general prefer 100% ownership or 
majority ownership. Some firms initially acquire 100% ownership of their investees, while 
others make subsequent investments to increase their shares to 100% or a majority position. 
Most of these firms are family-owned companies, which have a tendency to have 100% 
ownership of the acquired firm. However, some of the TMNCs prefer to be cautious in new 
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markets and engage in partnerships with local firms rather than outright ownership. There are 
two main reasons: (1) This is because a partnership option is less costly in case the company 
needs to exit the market; and/or (2) to overcome the liability of foreignness (i.e., additional 
costs experienced abroad arising from, for example, limited local knowledge). Some TMNCs 
that enter the new markets through partnerships make further investments for full ownership in 
following years. Finally, it should be noted that most of these TMNCs are holding companies; 
conglomerates operating in a wide range of sectors in Turkey. Holding company structure 
enables TMNCs WRUHGXFHµWUDQVDFWLRQFRVWV¶E\FUHDWLQJLQWHUQDOPDUNHWV inside the firm. 
 
4.1 Geographical Distribution of Acquisitions by TMNCs 
Figure 9.8: Distribution of the Value of the Mergers and Acquisitions among Economic 
Regions (2000-2013, Value of Investments - Million USD) 
 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters Mergers and Acquisitions Database and Deloitte Turkish Outbound M&A Review 
2012-2013. 
 
Figure 9.8 shows the distribution of value of investments among countries with different 
levels of economic development. Accordingly, unlike greenfield investments, developed 
4,946; 50%
3,691.7; 37%
1,242.2; 13%
Developed Countries
Transition Countries
Developing Countries
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countries host half of the TMNC acquisitions (4.9 billion US dollars or 50%). They are followed 
by developing countries (3.7 billion US dollars or 37%) and transition economies (1.2 billion 
US dollars or 13%). 
 
Figure 9.9: Geographical Distribution of the Value of the TMNC Acquisitions  
(2000-2013, Value of Investments - Million USD) 
 
 
 
Sources: Thomson Reuters Mergers and Acquisitions Database and Deloitte Turkish Outbound M&A Review 
2012-2013. 
 
Figure 9.9 shows the geographical distribution of the value of acquisitions by TMNCs. 
The EU is the most popular location in terms of value (3.6 billion US dollars or 37%) of 
investments. TMNCs prefer operation in developed EU countries to improve their skills in 
branding, technology, R&D, design, and management. The EU is followed by North America, 
South Asia, CIS, and Southeast Europe. CIS countries are not a very attractive destination for 
TMNC acquisition activities, as opposed to their popularity in Greenfield investments. 
Acquisitions in these regions are mainly PRWLYDWHGE\701&V¶GHVLUHWRUHDFKORFDOPDUNHWs 
3,623; 37%
3,150.2; %32
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and raw materials, by using their firm-specific advantages such as managerial experience and 
technology.  
Figure 9.10 shows the distribution of the top 62 TMNC acquisitions, with special 
reference to target countries. Russia attracts the highest value of investments (2.6 billion US 
dollars, or 26% of the total), Holland (i.e., the Kingdom of Netherlands) and the US (each with 
1.3 billion US dollars or 13%).  
Figure 9.10: Distribution of the Value of TMNC Acquisitions among Target Countries 
(2000-2013, Value of Investments - Million USD) 
 
 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters Mergers and Acquisitions Database and Deloitte Turkish Outbound M&A Review 2012-
2013. 
 
4.2 Sectoral Distribution of the Acquisitions by TMNCs 
Figure 9.11 shows the sectoral distribution of the acquisitions of TMNCs. The highest 
investments in value were in the food and beverages (3.4 billion US dollars or 34%), 
telecommunication (931 million US dollars or 9%), and banking and finance (827 million US 
dollars or 8%) sectors. How do these top three sectors score in the EU? The EU is the top 
destination for TMNC acquisitions in banking (750 million US dollars or 91%). The (8¶VVKDUH
in the telecommunications acquisitions is 270 million US dollars (or 29%). This is followed by 
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acquisitions in the food and beverages sector which attracts 200 million US dollars in 
investments (or 6% of the total in this sector).  
 
Figure 9.11: Sectoral Distribution of the TMNC Acquisitions (2000-2013, Value of 
Investments - Million USD) 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters Mergers and Acquisitions Database and Deloitte Turkish Outbound M&A Review 2012-
2013. 
 
Table 9.2: Top 10 Turkish acquirers between 2000-2013  
Order 
Acquisition 
value 
(million 
USD) Target Company Sector 
Target 
Country 
Recipient 
Company 
Purchased 
Share (%) 
1 2,130 
Russia and Ukraine 
Businesses of 
SABMiller (2011); Efes 
Breweries International 
(2010); CJSC Efes 
Brewery (2013) 
Food- Beverages 
Russia and 
Ukraine 
(2011); 
Holland 
(2010); 
Russia 
(2013) 
Anadolu Efes 
100,00 (2011); 
26,00 (2010); 
9,00 (2013)  
2 1,211.4 
CMA CGM SA (2010); 
Chrome Division of 
Mechel (2013); Malta 
Freeport Terminals 
(2011) 
Transporation, 
Mining and 
Infrastructure 
France 
(2010); 
Russia and 
Kazakhstan 
(2013); 
Malta (2011) 
<ÕOGÕUÕP+ROGLQJ
Inc. 
20,00 (2010); 
100,00 (2013); 
50,00 (2011) 
3 
1,071 
Godiva Chocolatier Inc 
(2007);  
'H0HW¶V&DQG\
Company (2013) 
Food- Beverages US <ÕOGÕ]+ROGLQJ,QF 100,00  
4 
598 Astir Palace (2013) Real-Estate Greece 'R÷Xú+ROGLQJ n/a 
5 580 
Finans Intl Holding NV 
(2006) 
Banking- Finance Holland Fiba Holding Inc. 100,00 
6 
532 
Razi Petrochemical 
(2008) 
Petrochemical 
Industry 
Iran 
*EUHWDú7DERVDQ 
Asia Gas Energy 
83,70 
7 
500 Belarusian Telecom 
(2008) 
Telecommunication Belarus Turkcell 80,00 
3,379.2; 34%
930,8, 9%
827.9; 8%699; 7%
686,5; 7%
3356,5; 34%
Food and Beverages
Telecommunication
Banking and Finance
Real Estate
Manufacturing and
Production
Other
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8 361.2 
Defy Appliances 
Limited (2011); Arctic 
(2002) 
Manufacturing and 
Household 
Electronics, Durable 
Goods 
South Africa 
(2011); 
Romania 
(2002) 
Arçelik Inc. 
100,00 (2011); 
57,29 (2002); 
33,85 (2002) 
9 
336.5 Trader Media East Ltd Media- Advertising Holland Hürriyet Invest B.V. 67,30 
10 
304.2 
Al Waha (2012, 2013); 
Coca Cola Beverages 
Pakistan (2008); Coca 
Cola Beverages Iraq 
Limited (2011); Coca 
Cola Almaty Bottlers 
LLP (2007) 
Food- Beverages 
Iraq (2011, 
2012, 2013); 
Pakistan 
(2008); 
Kazakhstan 
(2007)  
Coca Cola Beverage 
manufacuring Inc.  
n/a (2012); 
49,00 (2008); 
70,00 (2011); 
12,04 (2007); 
15,00 (2013) 
Sources: Thomson Reuters Mergers and Acquisitions Database and Deloitte Turkish Outbound M&A Review 
2012-2013. 
Table 9.2 shows the top 10 TMNCs which had the highest value of acquisitions between 
2003 and 2013. The acquisitions of these firms totalled 7.6 billion US dollars, which constituted 
77% of the sum of the largest 62 TMNC acquisitions worldwide. In other words, there is relative 
concentration of such investments in a relatively small number of firms. It should be noted that 
these firms operate oligopolistic markets in Turkey, exploiting CSAs such as economies of 
scale and scope and non-price competition. There were 43 deals (or 58% of the total) completed 
between 2010 and 2013. Arguably, the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and the Eurozone Crisis 
posed acquisition opportunities for TMNCs. Half of these deals were in the food processing, 
banking and finance, and telecommunications sectors.  
Anadolu Efes has a strong concentration in the CIS regiRQDQG5XVVÕDin particular (for 
a detailed discussion TMNCs in RussiD VHH%DNÕU DQG$FXU7KH UHPDLQLQJ WRS WZR
TMNCs included Yildirim Holding and Yildiz Holding which will be discussed below.  
5. Motivations and Strategies of TMNCs Investments and Structural 
Complementarities 
 
5.1. Competitive advantages and motivations of TMNCs 
Yildiz Holding is the biggest diversified food group by revenue in Central and Eastern 
Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, with about 7 billion US dollars in total sales in 2013. Its 
two high profile acquisitions can be considered as an example of an effort towards a global 
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consolidation strategy of EMNCs. <ÕOGÕ] +ROGLQJ DFTXLUHG WKH Belgian chocolate maker 
Godiva from American Campbell Soup Co. in 2007 for 850 million US dollars. This acquisition 
was the biggest single acquisition deal executed by a TMNC at the time. *RGLYD¶V UHYHQXHV
increased by 10 percent each year following the acquisition, reaching 765 million US dollars. 
The company significantly increased its marketing, infrastructure, and staff investments by 
,WLQFUHDVHGLWVVDOHVLQ86DQG-DSDQ%XLOGLQJRQ<LOGL]JURXS¶VNQRZOHGJHQHWZRUNV, 
and expertise, Godiva identified China, the Middle East, North Africa, and Turkey as new 
markets. Indeed, it entered new markets including Australia, China, Saudi Arabia, Korea, 
Macau, and Turkey. Its international sales increased from 43% in 2008 to 52% in 2013.   
Following the acquisition, Yildiz Holding entered 10 new countries, increased its 
branches from 480 to over 600, the number of points of sale increased from 10 thousand to over 
32 thousand. Its sales also increased from 450 million US dollars in 2007 to 765 million US 
dollars (Forbes, March 2014: 64).  
The success RI WKH DFTXLVLWLRQ ZDV GXH WR ³partnering´ ±³NHHSLQJ DQ DFTXLVLWLRQ
VWUXFWXUDOO\VHSDUDWHDQGPDLQWDLQLQJLWVRZQLGHQWLW\DQGRUJDQL]DWLRQ´± rather than traditional 
post-acquisition integration:  
,QVWHDGRIUXVKLQJWRLQWHJUDWHEXVLQHVVHVWKH\¶YHERXJKWRYHUVHDVWKH\¶YHDOORZHGWKHLUacquisitions to 
continue operating independently, almost as if there had been no change of ownership. Each organization 
focuses on what it does best even as it learns to use the resources and capabilities of the other to achieve 
its goals. (Kale, Digh and Anand 2009)  
 
³Partnering´ has been a key step for Yildiz Holding towards a µJOREDOFRQVROLGDWRU¶VWUDWHJ\, 
ZKLFK ³LV FKDUDFWHUL]HG E\ )6$V LQ RSHUDWLRQDO H[FHOOHQFH FRPELQHG ZLWK
restructuring/turnaround capDELOLWLHV´ :LOOLDPVRQDQG=HQJRamamurti and Sigh 
2009: 140). Here, Yildiz Holding and Godiva have developed effective organisational 
mechanisms that transferred their unique resources and capabilities into FSAs of one another.  
The success of this acquisition lies in the transfer of Yildiz Holding¶s FSAs obtained in 
developing markets to Godiva, DQG*RGLYD¶VWUDQVIHURI)6$VREWDLQHGLQDGYDQFHGGHYHORSHG
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markets to Yildiz Holding. ,QWKHZRUGVRI<ÕOGÕ]+ROGLQJ¶VGHSXW\FKDLUPDQ$OLhONHU³ZH
learnt how to do a global business. We had great benefits in the context of learning [following 
WKHDFTXLVLWLRQRI*RGLYD@´Harvard Business Review, November 2012). Godiva President and 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Jim Goldman at the time referred to the transformation that 
Godiva had undergone since it was acquired E\ <ÕOGÕ] +ROGLQJ LQ 7. He highlighted 
investments made in innovation in 2013 and noted that 
I am certainly sure of the fact that Godiva reached success with the right partner. We came across the 
strongest and newest marketing programs during the restructuring of the business and we expanded our 
business to new destinations, such as China, which helped to increase the bulk of our sales as well as gain 
experience (Cited in 7RGD\¶V=DPDQ 20 December 2011). 
This point adds a new dimension to the so-called new internationalisation theory that FSAs of 
the parent company obtained at home can further FSAs of a subsidiary to operate in new 
markets and benefit from structural complementarities that reinforce their internationalisation 
strategies. 
In other words, Yildiz Holding acquired unique resources and dynamic capabilities from 
Godiva, such as a global brand, managerial and marketing skills, and knowledge and 
experience. Godiva also acquired FSAs from Yildiz Holding, such as consumer insights, 
operating in weak institutional environments, and access to cash. This argument ± a mature 
MNC (i.e., Godiva) acquires FSAs from an EMNC (i.e., Yildiz Holding) ± challenges the 
conventional wisdom that EMNCs  
use international expansion as a springboard to acquire strategic resources and reduce their institutional 
and market constraints at home. In so doing, they overcome their latecomer disadvantage in the global 
stage via a series of aggressive, risk-taking measures by aggressively acquiring or buying critical assets 
from mature MNEs to compensate for their competitive weaknesses. (Luo and Tung 2007: 481) 
 
In fact, developed country MNCs as subsidiaries of EMNCs can acquire FSAs from their 
parents. 
Yildiz Holding took another major step towards its generic global consolidator strategy 
when it bought United Biscuits in November 2014 from private equity owners Blackstone 
Group and PAI Partners for about 2 billion pounds (3.2 billion US dollars). This made Yildiz 
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the world's third-biggest biscuit maker. In the words of CEO of Yildiz Holding, Murat Ulker: 
³:HZDQWWRJURZ8QLWHG%LVFXLWVWREHa global player as part of Yildiz. This will include 
enhancing its position in the UK, where Yildiz currently has minimal presence, so we will 
FRQWLQXHWR LQYHVW LQWKH8.DQG(XURSH´ (Cited in Financial Times 3 November 2014, my 
italics).  
TMNCs also explore FSAs in developed markets. For example, Turk Telekom acquired 
100% ownership of Invitel International in 2010 DQGWKHUHIRUHRZQHG³RQHRI&HQWUDODQGSouth 
eastern (XURSH¶V OHDGLQJ LQGHSHQGHQW ZKROHVDOH GDWD DQG FDSDFLW\ VHUYLFH SURYLGHUV WKDW
operates in 16 European countries with its 27 thousand kilometres long optical fibre QHWZRUN´
(Anadolu News Agency, 18 May 2010). A statement by Turk Telekom asserted that the 
LQYHVWPHQW LQ $XVWULD DLPV DW UHDFKLQJ WKH WDUJHW FRPSDQ\¶V )6$V DQG LQFUHDVLQJ 7XUN
7HOHNRP¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPSHWLWLYHQHVVWRDOORZLWHQWHUQHZPDUNHWV 
It was stated that Turk Telekom, which has an important position in terms of geographical connections, 
aims at improving this position by providing the access within Central and Eastern Europe and the access 
to the Middle Eastern and Asian markets and the Western European and American markets with this 
acquisition. Moreover, the statement also underscored that the acquisition will create synergy 
opportunities between Invitel International and Turk Telekom. (Anadolu News Agency, 18 May 2010) 
 
 Similarly, Sabanci Holding, the second largest conglomerate in Turkey, sought access 
WR 'X3RQW¶V )6$V WKURXJK DFTXLVLWLRQV 'X3RQW6$ WKH ODUJHVW 3RO\HVWHU PDQXIDFWXUHU LQ
Europe, jointly established by Sabanci Holding and DuPont in 1996, is the leading producer of 
LWV VHFWRU LQ (XURSH 7KH &(2 &HODO 0HWLQ IURP 6DEDQFÕ +ROGLQJ ZKLch acquired the full 
ownership of DuPontSA by an investment in 2005 in the US, stresses that they want to expand 
WKHLUPDUNHWVKDUHE\REWDLQLQJWHFKQRORJ\DQGEUDQGV³:HIRUHVHHWKDW'X3RQW6$ZLOOJURZ
profitably thanks to its high technology, world-renowned brands and 3.500 skilful employees 
DQG WKH HQWLUH LQGXVWU\ ZLOO EHQHILW IURP LWV TXDOLW\ JRRGV DQG VHUYLFHV´ Star Gazetesi, 9 
October 2004). 
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TMNCs also acquire firms with strong market penetration and exploit FSAs in emerging 
European and CIS countries. For example, Hurriyet AS, a Turkish publishing company, 
purchased Trader Media East Ltd. (TME) in 2007. Hurriyet is owned by Dogan Sirketler Grubu 
Holding A.S., which is one of the largest conglomerates in Turkey with investments in media, 
energy, manufacturing, and tourism. TME was one of the most important advertising agencies 
in Russia, CIS, and Eastern Europe. TME employs approximately 1,900 people in eight 
countries, namely Russia, Poland, Hungary, Croatia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus and 
Lithuania. Hurriyet ,QYHVW %9 +XUUL\HW¶V VXEVLGLDU\ ORFDWHG LQ Holland, initiated this 
LQYHVWPHQW ZKLFK ZDV PRWLYDWHG E\ +XUUL\HW¶V GHVLUH WR HQWHU QHZ PDUNHWV LQ the online 
advertisement business sector WKURXJK LQFRUSRUDWLQJ 70(¶V NQRZOHGJH H[SHULHQFH, and 
specialisation in high growth markets in Russia and CIS countries. Hurriyet¶V CEO Vuslat 
Dogan Sabanci noted that: 
We believe that the merger between Hurriyet and TME will create the biggest online advertisement 
platform in the region. The acquisition will give Hurriyet better access to high-margin online advertising 
and strengthen its presence in fast growing central and eastern European markets. (Anadolu Ajansi-
English News, 4 January 2007) 
 
Indeed, a year later, it has been noted that Hurriyet increased its operating income by 90% 
where 45% was GHULYHGIURP70(¶VDFWLYLWLHV5HIHUDQV1RYHPEHU 
 
5.2 Structural Complementarities 
Complex and interdependent interactions among context dependent structural and 
institutional complementarities and agency-level enabling conditions affect firm behaviour 
(Bakir, 2013). This section offers a brief assessment of interactions among structures and agents 
informing the realisation of investments. This nuanced view offers a new insight to FSA and 
CSA based analysis of firms¶ internationalisation activities. Specifically, although firms may 
be guided by FSAs and CSAs, the realisation of investment requires the existence of structural, 
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institutional, and agency-OHYHO FRPSOHPHQWDULWLHV WKDW UHLQIRUFH D ILUP¶V PRtivations and 
strategies.  
 7KHDFTXLVLWLRQRI*RGLYDE\<ÕOGÕ]+ROGLQJ, owner of diversified food company Ulker 
Group, in 2007 is an example demonstrating such interactions. A conventional IB explanation 
would consider this acquisition as a reflection of both inward and outward internationalisation 
strategy, which requires new brands, further management skills, technical know-how and 
access to new markets.  
However, the investment deal would not have taken place without two main structural 
complementarities: the US sub-prime mortgage crisis and appreciation of the Turkish lira 
against the US dollar. These two structural complementarities reinforced <LOGL] +ROGLQJ¶V 
acquisition of Godiva. In the words of YilGL]+ROGLQJ¶V&(2at the time:  
2XUELJJHVWFRPSHWLWRUVZHUHWKHILQDQFLDOLQYHVWRUVDQGZRUOG¶VJLDQWVLQFKRFRODWHVHFWRUZKLFKDFTXLUH
YDOXDEOHEUDQGVZKHQWKH\VHHLW«,QWKRVHGD\V>EHIRUHWKHDXFWLRQGD\@WKHGHDOSULFHZDVH[SHFWHGWR
be around 1.2-1.5 billion USD. There were two things that change the fate of this [acquisition] agreement. 
First, financial investors withdrew from the scene due to the credit crisis originating in the US financial 
markets. This was our biggest conjectural chance. [Second], depreciation of the US dollar against Turkish 
lira has offered an advantage to us. (Anka, 28 December 2007, emphasis added) 
 
In other words, the motivations and strategies of Yildiz Holding were not sufficient conditions 
to deliver an investment deal unless they were backed by structural conditions. Thus, 
appreciation of the effect of such structural variables on outward investment helps us to 
understand when and why structural contexts complement FSAs and CSAs. One of the key 
agency-level enabling conditions behind the acquisition was, LQ WKHZRUGVRI8ONHU*URXS¶V
KHDGRIERDUGRIGLUHFWRUV0XUDW8ONHU³ZHKDGHQRXJKPRQH\´$QND'HFHPEHU 
TMNCs also benefit from structural factors such as the economic recession in Europe 
following the GFC and Euro crisis. These external shocks hit global trade, and thus firms 
operating in the shipping business. For example, Yildirim Group, WKHZRUOG¶Vsecond largest 
chrome producer and operator in coal and metal, production and sale of fertilizer, mining and 
ferroalloys, shipping and ship buildings, and port management, bailed out heavily indebted 
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shipping giant CMA CGM by acquiring 20 percent of the French firm for 500 million US 
dollars (380 million euros) in 2010. This waV<LOGLULP¶VODUJHVWLQYHVWPHQWin Europe. CMA 
CGM was the world's third largest container operator and this acquisition contributed to 
Yildirim Group¶VKRUL]RQWDOLQWHJUDWLRQVWUDWHJ\ and profit. Yildirim has FSAs arising from its 
diverse activities ranging from energy trading and port operations to ferroalloy production, 
mining, and shipbuilding. Thus it was well positioned to control its supply chain. Therefore, 
the key FSA related to the acquisition included market information and knowledge of trends in 
the steel industry. In the words of Robert Yildirim, one of the owners and the Chairman of 
Yildirim,  
We supply the steel industry with raw materials so we know whether they are doing well or not, we see 
their order books so when they are slowing down or going up, we are talking to them so then that affects 
the shipping«If we sign a deal, we know what the market will be looking like two months ahead. So 
when orders are cut that also affects shipping two months later, so we share this market information with 
CMA CGM. So we are saying we see the market this way and how it affects shipping, we tell them [CMA 
CGM] when to move their empty boxes - this is happening in the market, be careful, put your empty 
container in position, the market is going up. (cited in Port Finance International, 25 April 2012) 
 
Yildirim Holing also explored FSAs IURPWKHDFTXLVLWLRQ,QWKHZRUGVRIWKHFKDLUPDQ³We 
can use the CMA CGM network to use the right people to reach the right people in other 
businesses«We can use CMA CGM as a logistics partner, it is a win-win investment for both 
parties, a perfect match´ (ibid). 
Further, structural complementarities such as the privatisation process also contributed 
to the internationalisation of TMNCs along with institutional complementarities and agency-
level enabling conditions such as FSAs *EUHWDú DFTXLUHG 5D]L 3HWURFKHPLFDO &R WKURXJK
,UDQ¶VILUVWSULYDWLsation opportunity activity. This investment was a reflection of the vision of 
EHFRPLQJ D ³JOREDOO\ EUDQGHG SLRQHHU LQ 7XUNH\´ 6LQFH  WKH ILUP has followed the 
VWUDWHJ\RILQYHVWLQJLQFRXQWULHVZLWKULFKUDZPDWHULDOUHVRXUFHV*EUHWDú*HQHUDO0DQDJHU
Osman Balta says the company plans to rehabilitate the inactive parts of Razi Petrochemical 
and increase the capacity utilization rate (Hazarworld, February 2013). In subsequent years, 
Gubretas had further expansion of existing investments. Similarly, Sise Cam also acquired two 
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state-owned glass factories during the privatisation process in Bulgaria. For example, Sise Cam 
had undertaken a joint acquisition with a Belgian company, Solvay Group, in 1997 to acquire 
one of the largest glass producers ¶GH6RGL-Devnya with a 35 million US dollar investment. 
Like Gubretas, this was folloZHGE\6LVH&DP¶Vgreenfield investments for the expansion of 
glass production in the subsequent years. 6LPLODUO\ 7XUN 7HOHNRPLNDV\RQ $6¶V DQG &DOLN
*UXEX¶V LQYHVWPHQWV LQ SULYDWLsation processes in Azerbaijan and Albania are examples of 
investments based on such FSAs. Turk Telekominikasyon AS entered the Azeri market by 
DFTXLULQJ D PRELOH QHWZRUN RSHUDWRU ZLWK DURXQG  PLOOLRQ VXEVFULEHUV 7KH FRPSDQ\¶V
partnerships in Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Moldova operate as the largest GSM companies in 
their respective countries. These examples show that TMNCs exploit their firm-specific 
managerial and technological advantages obtained in Turkey in less developed markets. 
 In sum, acquisitions by TMNCs in developed countries are motivated by inward 
internationalisation strategies of reaching new markets through obtaining technology, market 
information, and brands. Acquisitions in developing countries aim at accessing new markets 
and lowering costs by using their firm-specific technological and managerial advantages. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
This chapter offered an analysis of the current trends, competitive advantages, and motivations 
of TMNC investments in Europe with special reference to greenfield investments and 
acquisitions. It focused on geographic and sectoral distribution of these investments with 
particular emphasis on FSAs, CSAs, and structural complementarities. It examined the extent 
to which key theoretical perspectives on the MNC internationalisation can explain outbound 
investments from a developing economy like Turkey.  
TMNCs have their Greenfield investments in neighbouring geographies, especially in 
transition economies and developing countries. Only 22% of greenfield investments are located 
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in developed economies. There has been sectoral concentration in the construction sub-sector 
of the real estate sector. Most of these investments are in Turkmenistan and Russia. Such 
investments are mostly related to infrastructure investments (e.g., roads, tunnels, and bridges), 
premises, airports, and hotels. TMNCs also have similar infrastructure investments in Bulgaria 
and Romania. 701&V¶ JUHHQILHOG LQYHVWPHQWV DUH PRWLYDWHG E\ PDUNHW-seeking (access to 
domestic markets as well as access to EU markets via exports) and cost-seeking FDI (e.g., tax 
advantages, access to raw materials and cheap labour) where these firms exploit their FSAs, 
such as managerial and market knowledge, expertise, and technology. Key CSAs include 
operating in oligopolistic industries, economies of scale and leadership in home market, 
geographical, cultural, and institutional proximity. 
In contrast to greenfield investments, most TMNCs¶ acquisitions are in developed 
countries (72% of total investments). The EU is the most preferred region for these firms. 
Holland attracts the highest amount of investments in the EU. This is because it offers tax 
advantages and has extensive bilateral investment treaties, therefore Turkish firms incorporated 
in Holland (or subsidiaries of TMNCs) for fiscal considerations tend to use it as a home country 
for investing in other countries. Half of the acquisitions in Holland are concentrated in the 
manufacturing, banking and telecommunications sectors.  
Although the main current theoretical lenses available in IB literature such as FSAs and 
CSAs are widely used for developed country MNC internationalisation, they are also useful in 
explaining the internationalisation behaviour of EMNCs, in particular TMNCs. Thus, this 
chapter focuses on the FSAs of TMNCs obtained from both home CSAs and host CSAs in 
understanding the motivations behind TMNC investments in Europe. It showed that some of 
the largest TMNCs are guided by various complementary motivations, including the 
exploitation and exploration of FSAs and CSAs in different times and contexts. They are also 
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successful in relying on both FSAs obtained in home markets and FSAs obtained from host 
markets in their internationalisation activities.  
TMNCs have inward and outward internationalisation strategies. In regard to inward 
internationalisation, their key motivation has been to access brand, technology, market 
knowledge, and managerial knowledge/expertise in developed markets. In doing so, TMNCs 
aim to build or strengthen their competitive advantages. The acquisition of FSAs helps these 
firms to access new markets. Thus, one of the main motivations has been to internalise 
proprietary firm-specific assets. When TMNCs acquire firms in transition and developing 
countries, they benefit from outward internationalisation to exploit their FSAs, such as 
relatively advanced managerial knowledge and technology. However, it should be noted that 
some of the TMNCs, such as Yildiz Holding and Yildirim Holding, have stakes in developed 
country MNCs and they also exploit their FSAs and home country. These family-owned 
diversified firms also utilise global consolidator strategies in their business activities. 
It should also be noted that complementarities arising from structural contexts, such as 
the appreciation of the Turkish lira against major currencies during the GFC and Euro crisis, 
and financial difficulties of target companies in a crisis environment, have also contributed to 
701&V¶acquisition activities. Finally, it would be interesting to investigate in detail whether 
these deals make respective TMNCs formidable global competitors. 
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